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GOVERNMENT SCIENTISTS tEET THE PRESS: 
REACTIONS T.O THE RELEASE OF THE aPROFILE OF AMERICAN YOUTHa 
by 
Mark J. E;telberg, Zahava D. Doering, and Wayne S. Sellman 
During the closing days of a major research project, scientists often 
experience the general symptoms of 11 Headl.i ne Fantasy": recurrent images of 
worldwide press coverage and featured appearances on network television, 
momentary visions of being interviewed by the 11 60 Minutes II team or Wa 1 ter 
Cronkite (himself}, and occasional expectations of being called to do a short 
guest spot on the "Carson Show. 11 Yet, Jotinny never calls, and the newspapers 
never do seem to have the space for scientific findings. The fantasy soon 
fades as the once-treasured technical reports gather dust and the researcher 
wonders why so many copies were ever printed. -At least, that's the way it 
usually happens. 
On February 21, 1982, the Washington Post ran a front- :age article on 
the 11 Profil e" study with the title, "Blacks Score Bel ow Whi ':es in Pentagon 
Test. 11 The story was an "excl usi ve 11 for the Post and reporter George C. 
Wilson. The article contained over 1,000 words that described the study 
results and assorted reacti ons--i ncl udi ng a brief note on how the results 
we re obtained: 
The Reagan Administration has been treating the test 
results like political land mines, .trying to keep them from 
going off by meeting privately over the last several days 
with representatives of such groups as the Nati ona 1 Urban 
League, the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored Peop 1 e and the Mexican American Legal Defense and 
Educational [sic] Fund. The administration had planned to · 
hold off relernng the report until March 1. 
However, after learning that the Post had found out the 
test results, Pentagon Officials agreed to discuss them 
Friday and yesterday. They also called in specialists over 
the weekend to whip up a summary report for earlier public 
·_release, perhaps Monday (Wilson, 19Q2). 
The Washington Post story was pi eked up around the country by other 
newspapers and tel ev1 si on and radio networks. The· research project itself 
was quickly labled, as Jane Pauley reported on NBC Sunday Night News, "a 
study sure to become controversial." Since the Post covered the episode with 
the flair of investigative journalism--emphasiiing the newsworthiness of a 
11 semisecret" documen_t · and an anxious Admi ni strati o_n that decided to dodge 
"political land mines"--the "Profile" study was promoted as "hard news. 11 
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In this paper, the authors attempt .to (1) briefly recreate the 
circumstances leading up to the release of the study results and (2) examine 
the way in which the study results were reported- to the public by the popular 
media. We undertake this exercise in the hope that others faced with similar 
situations_cary avoid the various pitfalls encountered by academic and govern-
ment scientists who must sometimes "Meet the Press." 
.In the Beginning 
The 11 Profi le of American Youth 11 project was a direct outgrowth of the 
recognition that the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) 
had been misc· librated since it was adopted for joint use by the Military 
Services in 1~16. When the Department of Defense initially informed Congress 
about the ca 1 i bra ti on error--and the fact that the Services had unknowingly 
admitted a much larger proportion of enlistees from the lower ability ranges 
--the Congressional military committees were both shocked· and incredulous. 
First of all, most 1 egi sl ators never knew that the scores of recruits were 
still interpreted against a reference population originally designed in 
1944. The assumption in Congress was that the test scores of new recruits 
were statistically weighed against the scores of contemporary youth--that is, 
the most current nationwide pool of potentially eligible recruits. Some 
Congressmen, in reaction, thought that the delay between the time that the 
Department of Defense first suspected the miscal ibration and the official 
testimony describing it was part of a purposeful deception. They maintained 
that the Department of Defense knew all along about the inflated test 
results, and it deliberately concealed the statistical error in an effort to 
make the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) look better than it was in reality. As 
far as they were concerned, the AVF was on the brink of falling apart. 
Another group of legislators--supporters of the AVF--thought the timing 
of the Defense Department's 11 mea culpa" coincided all too perfectly with the 
Carter Administration's push for a return to draft regist-ration {since the 
Administration was also campaigning on Capitol Hill for the authority to 
include women in the registration plan). The admission of error by AVF 
testing experts--and the consequent enlistment of otherwise unqualified 
recruits--was seen as an attem·pt to buttress the scheme for the registration 
of men and women. · 
The integrity of the Department of Defense, among both the ·supporters 
and detractors of the AVF, was badly undermined. In an attempt to restore 
some of its credibility and .to solve the problem of obtaining a-calibration 
population, the Department of Defense elected to administer its _selection an~ 
. classification test to a national probability sample of American youth. 
This, it was hoped, would es tabH sh once and for all whether the kinds of 
people entering the military were reasonably representative of· the popula-
tion-at-large (as the Defense Department contended) or the 11 dumniies, 11 
11 deadbeats, 11 and "social outcasts·" so frequently depicted in the critical 
commentary. 
In January 1980, a set of working and cooperative agreements were 
concluded between s~veral agencies, and the "Profile of American Youth" was 
officially launched. In the background were two organizations: the Depart-
ment of Labor (the major sponsor of the National. Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of 
Youth Labor force Behavior, who·se sample was to be administered the ASVAB} 
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and the Ohio State University's Center for Human Resource Research (the prime 
contractor for the NLS). In the fore ground were the Department of Defense 
and its contractor, the National Opinion Research Center (NORC} of the 
University of Chicago ( the data collection subcontractor for the NLS). 
During the initial stage of the project, -the Department of Defense 
developed detailed plans for data analysis and commissioned several related 
studies. In part, Defense researchers wanted to protect this work and ensure 
that a statistical error of the sort that led to the miscalibration would 
not occur under any circumstances. The commitment to release publicly the 
test results, as part of the NL$, suggested a level of documentation not 
normally associated with operational government studies. Two research 
papers--a review of test score declines (Waters, 1981} and a historical 
summary of subpopulation differences on ability tests (Eitelberg, 1981)--were 
commissioned for use as background material on anticipated findings. In 
addition, NORC was asked to document all aspects of the study in a series of 
technical reports (Frankel & McWilliams, 1981; McWilliams, 1980; McWilliams & 
Frankel, 1982). The pretest for the study, the fieldwork and the sample were 
to be documented in sufficient detail so that any researcher could have easy 
access to all of the procedures and the rationale behind them (Sheatsley, 
1980). 
Because of the importance of the sampling components of the "Profi 1 e 11 
study to the ove·rall reliability of the ability estimates produced, a peer 
review committee of experts in the field of survey sampling was asked to 
provide an independent review of the study sample design and estimation 
procedures. An independent study to evaluate the suitability of the ASVAB 
for measuring the aptitudes of a national sample of civilian youth and its 
equity for females and minorities was also commissioned (Bock & Mislevy, 
1981). Furthermore, a Department of Defense team of testing experts and 
computer specialists conducted a detailed data audit at NORC (Sellman & 
Hagan, 1981). Finally, as an initial contribution to scholarly study of 
these data, the Defense Department contracted for an analysis and discussion 
of possible causative factors affecting the test performance (Bock & Moore, 
1982). 
The official Department of Defense report, together with the related 
independent contractor studies, were all scheduled for completion in early 
1982. 
The Study Hits The Street 
As expected, the "Profile of American Youth" results mirrored the 
results of numerous other predecessor studies in the field of testing 
research--including the finding that whites score, on the average, consider-
ably higher than blacks, and Hispanics score in between these two groups. 
When the "Profile" study results were discussed with Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logi s-
ti cs), the decision was reached to provide a preview of the findings to 
selected national minority associations before public release of the full 
report. There were basically four reasons for conducting the special brief-
ings with minority groups: ( 1} Secretary Korb wanted to ensure that these 
gr·oups and their spokespersons were personally informed about the study so 
that they would not be "blindsided" by the release of the report and the 
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pCiSsible misinterpretation of the data by the press; (2) it was felt that 
these groups, especially, should be made fully aware of the reasons for which 
the study was conducted and its intended use by the Department of Defense; 
(3) because of the almost inevitable prospects for misinterpretation of the 
data and sensationalism by the press, the suggestions of the special interest 
groups were sought concerning the release of the findings; and (4) in provid-
ing the special briefings, the Department had actually hoped to minimize the 
pub 1 ic attention given to racial /ethnic differences per se and thereby to 
highlight the true purpose of the project--namely, the comparison of military 
recruits with their civilian counterparts and the establishment of current 
national norms for the ASVAB. 
In earl· February 1982, the Department of Defense held a series of 
meetings· with national minority groups. These included the NAACP, the 
National Urban League, ASPIRA, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education 
Fund, the Puerto Rican Coalition, representatives of the Office of the 
Resident Commission of Puerto Rico, the League of United Latin American 
Citizens, the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund, and La Raza. 
As a background to these meetings, attendees were provided with several 
of the technical documents available at the time. These included the reports 
of the pretest and fieldwork, the report on the quality of the ASVAB, and the 
executive summary of the analysis of possible causative factors. Thus, these 
groups received background reports only, none of which actually analyzed the 
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), i.e., the enlistment test portion of 
the ASVAB. In addition, Defense technical experts were available during and 
after the meetings to answer questions. 
The reactions of the minority group representatives varied. Generally, 
they expressed astonishment that the Defense Department would be contacting 
them--and asking their advi ce--about a government-sponsored study. In the 
case of the NAACP, this reaction was intensified and criticism was leveled 
against the 11 Profile 11 study, largely in keeping with the long-standing posi-
tion of the organization against standardized testing. In contrast to the 
NAACP, the National Urban League expressed general support for the study. 
Furthermore, the Urban League representatives stated their personal desires 
that the results not create any new debate about the fairness of tests--but, 
rather that they start a nationaTcfiscussion about ways to provide more and 
better job training programs for young blacks. · 
Several of th~ Hispanic groups questioned Defense officials as to why 
they had not been contacted and consulted at the start ·of the 11 Profi 1 e11 
study. Some were concerned, too, about the way in which various different 
subgroups were categorized simply as "Hispanic" by the data analysts. 
While the minority· briefings were still being held, the Defense 
hierarchy was weighing the various possible methods for releasing the 
"Profile" results to the public. There were four basic alternatives: 
(1) call a press conference; (2) set up small meetings with selected members 
of the press and others; (3) issue a press release, but hold no conference or 
meetings; and (4) release the report without any press release or conference, 
and mail copies of the published document to interested parties with an 
appropriate cover letter. These four methods had all been employed in the 




On Fri day, February 19th~ 1982 the di rectors of the 11Profil e" project 
were informed by the Defense Department's ·office of Public Affairs that 
George C. Wi 1 son, a reporter with the Washington Post, had a copy of the 
11 Profi 1 e of American Youth II report. It was qu1 te obvious to the study 
di rectors that Mr. Wilson could not have possessed an actual copy of the 
report •. First of all, the report was still in draft form and there were only 
four copies of the draft in existence. Second, there were no written tran-
scripts of the briefings presented to the minority leaders, and no summary 
papers of any study findings were ever distributed. In all likelihood, Mr. 
Wilson had copies of some of the technical materials as well as access to 
personal notes made at one of the minority leader briefings. 
Up to that point, the "Profile" report had been scheduled for release 
on March 6, 1982 after Secretary Korb's return from an overseas trip. Mr. 
Wilson, however, did not offer much support in behalf of the Defense Depart-
ment's plan: he said that he knew a great deal about the study results and 
the "special briefings" with minority groups and that he fully intended to 
place an article about the whole affair in Sunday's edition of the Washington 
Post. · 
Needless to say, some very quick decisions were made about all of the 
previously unsettled matters concerning the release of the report. In order 
to minimize the consequences of any inaccuracies that may have been present 
in materials or notes made available to Mr. Wilson, Secretary Korb person-
ally provided the Washington Post reporter with most of the pertinent facts 
regarding the background and content of the study. 
Since formal publication of the study results was not scheduled for 
another two weeks, the Washington Post incident gave rise to a somewhat 
frenetic weekend on the part of "Profile" study staffers charged with prepar-
ing, pub 1 i shi ng, and re 1 easing the report. A fact sheet was first assemb 1 ed 
for the White House that gave the ful 1 background of the effort. A press 
statement for the news media was also developed. In addition, representa-
tives from each of the minority groups. were contacted by phone and informed 
about the Washington Post incident. Severa 1 organizations requested assur-
ance that the Defense Department had not leaked the information in an attempt 
to embarrass them. Finally, the completing touches were put on the report, 
·it was typed in final form, and· two-hundred copies were printed and bound. 
NORC was contacted and alerted to the fact that, in all likelihood, the 
organizations and i ndi vi dual researchers would be contacted by a curious 
press looking for different "angles" to the story. In addition, members of 
the Department of Defense's ASVAB Steering Committee, consisting of high-
ranking officers from each of the Military Services, were notified. · 
· The Washington Post piece appeared on schedule in Sunday's edition. It 
was quickly pi eked up by the news wire services, and Secretary Korb found a 
number of reporters outside his home. 
On the Monday morning of the· following day, it was decided (in consult-
ation with Secretary of Defense Weinberger) that a general press conference 
would be held to accommodate the now-clamoring media. At 10:00 a.m., Monday, 
February 22, 1982 over 50 reporters from newspapers, news services, maga-
zines, radio, and television, some of whom were openly hostile about the 
racial /ethnic di f.ferences emphasized by the Washington Post, packed them-
selves into the Pentagon press room. Secretary Korb conducted the news 
conference. For those interested, copies of related reports were made 
available. a1 
During the next four days, the study directors received nearly 400 
inquiries. Articles on the ~Profile of American Youth" appeared in more than 
75 newspapers and in all of the major news magazines. 
Press Treatment of the Study Results 
In general, there is a two stage process for press coverage of "contro-
versial" research findings. First comes the news article, usually written b.r, 
the "area expert" in most large newspapers. In the case of the "Profile• 
study, news articles were written by either reporters assigned to the Defense 
Department or, in a very few cases, reporters with a modicum of knowledge in 
the social or oehavioral sciences. Smaller newspapers characteristically use 
the wire service accounts (such as UPI or AP), articles authored by their own 
Washington Bureau correspondents, or the wire service pieces from the larger 
and more prestigious newspapers. When wire service accounts are used, the 
1 oca 1 paper can edit out as much as it wants, and it reserves the right to 
tack on the jazziest, most eye-catching headline, often suited to its own 
particular readership. 
The second stage will ordinarily occur about three days to one week 
after the news article has appeared. This is the "news analysis phase 11--when 
the editors of the paper express their own views concerning the study or its 
outcome, when the local and syndicated columnists have had a chance to evalu-
ate the "larger context" or "true meaning" of the study, and all of the irate 
or supportive readers have had the time to compose their letters to the 
editor. 
The news accounts of the "Profile" study generally fell into two 
categories: (1) those that emphasized the racial differences in test 
results, and (2) those that centered on comparisons between the tested 
abilities of civilians and their contemporaries in the military. Below is a 
brief list of headlines from a representative sample of newspapers: 
Emphasis on Racial Differences 
"Blacks Score Below Whites in Pentagon Test" 
--Washington Post 
"Hispanic, Black Scores Lower on Military Test" 
--The San Antonio News 
"Survey Finds Blacks Lag in Math, Verbal Tests" 
--Fayetteville (NC) Times 
"Pentagon Calm at Test Gap of Whites, Blacks, Hispanics" 
--Baltimore Sun 
"Blacks Score Half as Well As Whites 1n Pentagon Test" 
--Chicago Sun Times 





Emphasis on Civilian-Military Comparison 
~Volunteers in Armed Forces Test· 'Above Average'" 
--New York Times 
"Volunteer Military Recruits Equal To Civilians on Tests" 
--Chicago Tribune 
"Pentagon Finds Recruits More Trainable" 
--Christian Science Monitor 
"How Smart Are U-. S. Soldiers?" 
--Newsweek 
"Military-Civilian Test Score Gap Closing" 
--Navy Times 
"76-80 Lag In Quality Confirmed" 
--Army Times 
A· third type of "news" article, related only indirectly to the 
"Profile" study also surfaced in several papers around the country. These 
were the sensationalist accounts--often inaccurate and typically distorted--
probably directed more at arousing readers than reporting the facts. The Los 
Angeles Times Wire Service (carried in at least 25 newspapers, especially,n 
. the West and Midwest), for example, decided to introduce its report on the 
11 Profile 11 study results with the following lead sentence: 
The Defense Department Monday released an independent 
analysis of its nationwide youth achievement test that 
cited genetic factors as one reason for the relatively 
poor performance · of blacks and Latinos on the test ( Los 
Angeles Times, 1982). -
Similarly, the St. Paul (MN)· Pioneer Press, in an arti-cl e headlined 
"Study Revives Ethnic Inf eri ori ty Controversy," provided the f o 11 owing intro-
duction to its description of the research project: "Whites tend to outscore 
blacks and Hispanics on standard military qualifying tests because of "social 
separation" of ethnic groups, according to a controversi a 1 Pentagon study 
released Monday (Greve, 1982a). 11 And the Philadelphia Inquirer carried a 
comparable lead sentence in its report on how "Pe.ntagon Says low Test Scores 
[are] Fault of Culture": "A Pentagon study showing that whites tend to 
outscore blacks and Hispanics on standard military qualifying tests cites 
'social separation' of the ethnic groups as a principal cause but also 
mentions possible genetic fac~ors (Greve, 1982b)." 
The first type of article--emphasizing racial differences--was more or 
less expected. It reflects one major aspect of the historic testing contro-
versy. It also comes at a time \\tlen social services are being reduced, and 
the difference between majority and minority, rich and poor, advantaged and 
disadvantaged are gaining more frequent mention in political forums. 
The primary reason for the popularity of this particular type of 
article, however, has as much to do with a common misinterpretation of the 
data by the press as anything else. Beginning with the Washington Post 
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version, and spreading· around the. country, many reporters substituted "per-
cent scores II for "percenti 1 e scores II and then proceeded to compare groups by 
rGf erring to· percentage margins of difference and "points II scored. Thus, 
reported the Chicago Sun Times, "Blacks Score Half as Well As Whites 11 
(Chicago Sunday Sun Times, 1982); or, 11young black men and women did less than 
ha 1 f as we 11 as wh, tes ,n math and verbal tests • • • 11 (Washington Post News 
Service, 1982), "observed one North Carolina paper; or, "scores for whites 
averaged more than twice as high as those for blacks, 11 remarked Diane Sawyer 
on the "CBS Morning Show" (Sawyer, 1982}. One wonders whether the popular 
media would have headlined the racial differences on the test if (1) they 
knew that the finding was quite common and consistent in studies of this 
nature, or (2) they fully comprehended the statistical character of the test 
scores shown in the Defense Department report. Suppose, for instance the 
Chicago Sun Tii1es had captioned the article as follows: "Blacks Score, On The 
·Average, Jus., Over One Standard Deviation Less Than Whites"; or, "On the 
Average: Pentagon Study Consistent With Previous Literature. 11 Not much on 
grabbing the reader; not much on selling newspapers. 
The second type of article--emphasizing the military-civilian compari-
son--was probably 1 ess used by the popular media than the racial comparison 
sort. No wonder, material such as that reported by the Christi an Science 
Monitor in "Pentagon Finds Recruits More 'Trainable'," though interesting and 
informative, is hardly the stuff controversy is made of: "In general, those 
who join the Armed Services score a bit higher than the national average on 
qualification tests measuring 'trainability'" (Knickerbocker, 1982). 
Controversy does run rampant, however, in the "genetic factors" genre 
of news stories that appeared. These stories were basically a development of 
another error by the popular media: the linking of the Department of Defense, 
directly, with the results of an independent study conducted by one of its 
contractors (Bock & Moore, 1982). As indicated earlier, in 1980 the Depart-
ment of Defense commissioned a well-known and respected psychologist at the 
University of Chicago to perform an analysis and discussion of possible 
causative factors affecting test performance. This study was to be' the 
initial contribution to scholarly investigation of the new data base--but, 
like most sponsored research, an effort that in no way reflected the official 
policy or opinion of the sponsoring agency. 
The resulting study of the possible causative factors--titled The 
Profile of American Youth: Demographic Influence on ASVAB Test Performance 
--was not available for publlc d1str1but1on when the "Profile'_' study report 
was released. But Department of Defense officials elected to release the 
"executive summary" from the sponsored research report as an example of the 
type of work that may come out of the "Profile" data base and an illustration 
of the potential implications of the "Profile" study for social and educa-
tional policy. Unfortunately, items were taken out of context by the press 
from an "executive summary" of a full report that was not yet available. 
The "genetic factor" confusion eventually showed up in the editorials 
and syndicated columns of some newspapers. One columnist, for example, 
observed that "the people who pushed the Pentagon to do the study in· the 
first pl ace were a group of ultra-conservative Southern 1 awmakers" who, for 
the first time since Hitler's government, have dare~ to spend tax money on 
11 this kind of ridiculous research" (Gonzalez, 1982). In another column 




a "return to the American-style racism. that had diminished but never 
disappeared." The study marks a return to "Social Darwinism," the author 
pointed out, and a "comeback" for theories of genetic i nferi-ori ty so that the 
new captains of social and economic ·America can build a case for renewed 
-racial segregation. "The 19th Century is back," the Chicago Tribune 
journalist reported (Jarrett, 1982). · 
The irony in· this confusion and selective reading of material out of 
context 1 i es in the fact that the Department of Defense decided at the very 
outset of the "Profi 1 e" study to steer cl ear of any interpretation of the 
data. The "Profi 1 e of American Youth" report c~nsequently describes the 
study and simply presents the results of initial analyses. No interpretation 
is offered and very little material on previous research is even presented in 
the section that deals with subpopulation differences. · 
It should be noted here that press coverage centering on the genetics 
question was not widespread. Most columns and editorial commentary chose 
instead to_ treat such- issues as social and educational inequality, and the 
apparent "good news" about the quality of _recruits in the All-Volunteer 
Force. The Washington Post article was also the subject of some harsh criti-
cism by its readers (Washington Post, 1982). In fact, the Washington Post 
ombudsman later offered a public apology on behalf of the paper. The head-
line and story were 11 tilted, 11 the Post's ombudsman wrote; the article 
probably received too much attention as the lead -story on the day it 
appeared, and it took too much play away from the "principal conclusion of 
the test: that the All-Volunteer Force is 'above average'." "Altogether," 
he commented, "I conclude the story was misplayed" (Mccloskey, 1982). 
In another highly unusual development, the Associated Press issued a 
retraction of its wire service report that "young blacks scored 1 ess than 
half as well as young whites" on the Pentagon tests. "The story -erroneously 
mixed percentile ratings with percentage scores," the Associated Press 
admitted, along with a short explanation of percentile scores and a descrip-
tion of ·the average scores of whites and blacks. 
Some Lessons Learned 
A few years ago, Lee J. Cronbach offered "some possible general i za-
tions" about the difficulties that arise when the scholar enters the arena of 
policy (Cronbach, 1975). First of all, Cronbach wrote, "controversies over 
social science are ·not created by findings as such .••• The journalist, by 
and large, controls what becomes public and when. 11 And, "repeatedly, we have 
seen jQurnalists mining scholarly reports for controversial copy, distorting 
the original to make it more exciting, pointing up disagreements, and some-
times reporting only the iconoclastic side." 
Problems inevitably follow, Cronbach· observed, when scientists enter 
the public eye through the news media: 
The American academic is ill-trained to cope with the 
media ·and the pub 1 i c. In his normal 1 i fe he speaks to a 
captive,_ note-taking audience. He. writes for archive_s where 
those who want his thoughts in ex ten so can find them, and 
where· the reader can be trusted to weigh sentences in 
context. But the public reads the headlines and the snappy 
quotes, and only half-remembers them (Cronbach, 1975). 
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So it goes that "the academic needs writing skills of an entirely unaCCl:IS-
to,ned order if he is to make sure that no unwanted implication wi 11 be drawn 
from a buried sentence, that no sentence quoted out of context ~11 advocate 
what he does not be 1 i eve, and that no co 1 orful aside wi 11 be remembered 
instead of his main message (Cronbach, 1975). 11 
The pi tf a 11 s of having one's work misinterpreted by the· news media and 
public still hold true. The need to pick and choose with expert care the 
words and numbers the public see is one of the more obvious "lessons learned" 
from the "Profile of American Youth" experience described above. But there 
are, of course,.many other lessons. 
The firs"'. and most important lesson, by far, involves the quality of 
research--espLdally that which involves a potentially controversial topic.• 
Good research--based on sound methodological principles, proper planning and 
execution, with high-quality supporting studies and documents--can almost 
fight its own battles if a controversy ensues concerning its results. 
Critics may attack i nterpretati ans of the findings or u·s~ of the findings or 
the purposes of the study, or anything el se--but, as 1 ong as research is 
reproducible and solid in its development and performance, the findings them-
selves can stand protected in the face of criticism. Throughout all of the 
controversy surrounding the 11 Profi 1 e 11 study, there was not one adverse 
comment concerning the mechanics of the study or the data analysis. 
Another "lesson" involves the need to plan very carefully the manner of 
public release and the points to highlight in the study. In the case of the 
"Profile" study, the Department of Defense had hoped to to put the results on 
racial/ethnic differences into perspective by holding briefings with minority 
groups. As it turned out, the racial/ethnic differences became a focal point 
precisely because of the briefings. The press, it seems, could not bring 
itself to disregard this aspect of the study, and the actions of the Depart-
ment only operated tODring even more attention to the racial/ethnic differ-
ences. On the other hand, if the Department had decided to ignore the entire 
question and focus its own efforts on what it knew best--the quality of its 
personnel--it is highly unlikely that the Washington Post article and similar 
stories would have even been written. --
A 1 ong with the need to 1 ead the press in the areas to be underscored 
the most, government scientists should follow two important rules: (1) keep 
the material you give the press as simple as possible; and (2) spell every-
thing out as simply and as clearly as possible, even at the risk of "insult-
ing ttiei ntell i gence" of the audience. From the very outset, an effort 
should have been made to explicate the most fu.ndamental points of the study. 
and, of course, the definition of ·such common (to us) statistical measures as 
percentile scores. One should always assume, in a _variant of Murphy's own 
Law of Error, the press will probably misinterpret everything you say. 
And,• oh yes, there is one last · 11 lesson 11 in studies of this nature: 
Don't expect Johnny Carson to call. But Carl Rowan or George Will or Jack 
Anderson or Jack Ki 1 patri ck might very well be banging on your door when you 
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